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Building
Democracy in the Central Andes: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective Miguel Centellas Western Michigan University Abstract
This study places Bolivia in comparative perspective and seeks to
explain the country's unexpected two decades of democratic stability. Four
potential explanations are pursued: 1) Bolivia's political institutional
structure, 2) historical legacies, 3) the role of individual statesmen, and 4)
the role of a patrimonial political elite. If Bolivia's democratic stability is
best explained by its unique institutional arrangement of "parliamentarized
presidentialism," then this would contribute to our general theoretical
understanding of democracy and democratic consolidation. A variety of methods
will be used to test these four possible explanations, including qualitative
comparative analysis, archival research, and open-ended elite interviews. 1.
Research Question and Rationale
For most of its history, Bolivia was the epitome of Latin American
political instability. Thus, it is remarkable that in July 2002, Bolivian
citizens will vote in their fifth regularly scheduled national election since
the nation's transition to democracy in 1982. Bolivia's recent experience with
democracy sharply contrasts with the experience of its Central Andean
neighbors, Ecuador and Peru. All three began their democratic transition in
1978-79, though by 1992, Peru had reverted to authoritarian rule and Ecuador's
democracy seems perpetually on the brink of collapse. How do we explain the
comparative stability of Bolivia's democratic political system? Why has it
experienced neither a democratic breakdown (as in Peru) nor chronic instability
(as in Ecuador)? In the context of Latin America's troubled political history,
the survival of democracy in Bolivia defied most expectations and begs for an
explanation. The dependent variable is democratic stability rather than democratic consolidation. This study does
not assume that Bolivia's democracy is consolidated, only that it has been
relatively stable, especially when compared to the other Central Andean
democracies. The endurance of formal democratic procedures is an essential
(though not a sufficient) condition for democratic consolidation. Minimally,
democratic stability means that electoral calendars are respected, and that
political actors do not pursue their policy preferences by extra-constitutional
means. The limited literature on Bolivia's democratization highlights a new
exceptionalism. Conaghan and Malloy (1994) point out that of the three Central
Andean countries, only Bolivia successfully implemented neoliberal economic
reforms in the 1980s. In a cross-national study of Latin American democracies,
Jones (1995) finds a significant relationship between his dummy variable for
Bolivia and presidential legislative majorities, which is strongly related to
the survival of presidential democracy. Mayorga (1992; 1997) suggests that
Bolivia's unique institutional design accounts for its democratic stability.
Nevertheless, the causal relationship between formal institutions -especially
the electoral system- and Bolivia's democratic stability has not yet been systematically
studied. My goals are to: 1) explore the relationship between formal and
informal political institutions or norms of behavior and democratic stability
in Bolivia, 2) examine the impact of specific historical or contextual factors
that may affect democratic stability, 3) isolate the key explanatory factors
for stable democratic politics in Bolivia, and 4) consider the prospects for sustained
democratic stability. My study extends from the literature on modern democratic theory and
political institutions. I examine post-transition politics. Rustow (1970)
describes the process of democratization as involving three stages: 1) the
breakdown of the nondemocratic regime, 2) the installation of a democratic
regime, and 3) democratic consolidation. Here, I consider democratic
consolidation as the process of deepening democracy after a democratic regime
has been installed, rather than as an end-point. Because democratic
consolidation requires democratic stability, this study looks to see whether Bolivia's
democratic stability is the kind that can lead to democratic consolidation. The
period of study begins with the installation of the first democratically elected
government in 1982 and ends in 2004 (upon completion of field research).
Although comparative, I adopt a case-oriented approach. Discovering the key factors contributing to Bolivia's democratic
stability may help in developing reforms meant to strengthen other new
democracies. This is especially true if the key factors for Bolivia's
democratic stability are institutional, rather than idiosyncratic ones. The
Bolivian experience may be especially relevant for its Central Andean
neighbors, but its lessons may also be applicable beyond Latin America to other
countries that face the challenge of building stable democracy under historically
unfavorable circumstances. Of course, it is possible that factors supporting
democratic stability in early stages may hinder the prospects for long-term
democratic stability. If the quality of democracy remains low for an extended
period, political and social actors may no longer be willing to play the
democratic game. Understanding the relationship between democratic stability
and the quality of democracy help us focus on building democracy "for the long
haul" (Huntington 1997). 2.
Conceptual Framework
Latin America does not have a history of democratic politics.
Traditional politics, described either in forms of its centralism (Vliz 1980),
a caudillo tradition of personalism
(Dealy 1992), or corporatism (Wiarda 1981), were the regional norm for most of
the post-independence period. This was especially true in the Central Andes. By
the mid-1970s, even Chile and Uruguay, two countries with long democratic
traditions, were under authoritarian rule. Prospects for democracy in Latin
America seemed bleak; only Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica were
democracies. Beginning in the late 1970s, Latin American authoritarian regimes gave
way to democratic ones. The pace of democratization and democratic
consolidation, however, has differed across the region, including setbacks in
Peru and Venezuela that clearly fit O'Donnell's (1994) description of
delegative democracy. And while the Central Andean republics democratized
first, later democratizers such as Argentina and Chile seem to be fairing
better. This study aims to discover what factors account for the relative
democratic stability in Bolivia. 2.1.
Democracy and Democratization
In its simplest form, democracy means "a form of government in which
the people rule" (Srensen 1998, 3). The so-called classical theories of
democracy emphasize direct self-rule of the demos in a small community made possible by direct, active,
and equal participation by members of the polity. The modern development of
very large and complex polities made the application of such a definition
difficult. In its place, most scholars have accepted a liberal or
representative definition of democracy that rests on competitive elections.
Such a political system provides the "processes by which ordinary citizens
exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders" (Dahl 1956, 3). Most of the comparative literature on democratization adopts Dahl's
(1956; 1971) definition of democracy (or polyarchy) as a political system involving three dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. These minimalist definitions of democracy focus
primarily on the institutions of formal electoral democracy and are largely
extensions of Schumpeter's description of democracy as "that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions by means of competitive
struggle for the people's vote" (1943, 269).[1]
Democratic self-rule was thus possible in large polities due to the development
of representative, electoral institutions by which voters select legitimate
policy-makers and hold them accountable. The liberal model of democracy has not gone uncriticized. Pateman
(1970) and Barber (1984) criticized the Schumpeterian model of democracy for
ignoring the important role early liberals, such as J.S. Mill, had given to
popular participation. For them, popular participation was an essential element
in democracy and could not be reduced to elections. While recognizing that
representative democracy was necessary at the national level, Pateman and
Barber argued for direct, participatory democracy at the local level, such as
in the workplace or in neighborhood associations. Mansbridge (1983) criticized
the liberal model of democracy for its emphasis on adversarial politics.
Adversary democracy cannot account for instances when disagreement is too deep
for mere vote-counting; at such times, Mansbridge argued, deliberative politics
are more in order. Other critics, such as Macpherson (1977), Gould (1988), and
Dryzek (1996) also pointed out that liberal democracy is too closely tied to
capitalism, which threatens the egalitarian premise essential to democracy. Proponents of liberal democracy have accepted many of the arguments
made by those who favor deeper forms of democracy. Dahl (1971) agreed that
polyarchy was a second-best solution to the problem making democracy possible
in large, pluralist polities. Attention was shifted from democracy to democratization, the constant deepening and renewal of democratic
norms. Thus, like the critics of liberal democracy, Dahl (1985) argued for the
extension of democratic norms into the social and economic spheres, though
continuing to emphasize the procedural elements necessary for democracy.[2]
To this procedural minimum have been added the importance of the accountability
of rulers and civilian control over the military (Karl 1990), the rule of law
(O'Donnell 1996), the existence of an effective state (Linz and Stepan 1996),
and a vibrant civil society (Putnam 1993). These additions expand Dahl's
formulation by focusing on democracy as a process (and the conditions necessary for that process)
rather than specific policy orientations. These additional elements are
essentially compatible with the conditions Dahl (1971) considered necessary for
political democracy to be possible.[3] Still, minimalist conceptions of democracy are more practical for
comparative studies of democracy since "they deliberately focus on the smallest
possible number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable
standard for democracy" (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 433). Thus, most
comparative studies of democracy use Dahl's definition of democracy as a base
reference to determine if a state is democratic. Linz and Stepan, for example,
define democracy as "a free competition of power by peaceful means, free
elections at regular intervals in a constitutional framework that provides
conditions for such a free competition in terms of freedom of speech, of
assembly, of political organization" (1978, 5-6). Earlier scholars, while trying to explain why democracy was more
prevalent in Western societies than elsewhere, had argued that certain social
or economic preconditions were necessary for democracy. Lipset (1959) argued
that modernization or industrialization was necessary for democracy;
socioeconomic development had to come first before democracy was possible.
O'Donnell (1973) presented a scathing critique of this approach, pointing out
that economic development tended to produce bureaucratic-authoritarian states
rather than democracies. Following the Weberian tradition, Almond and Verba
(1963) argued that a certain civic culture, such as the Anglo-American one, was
necessary for democracy. Huntington (1984) and Karl (1990) criticized this as
an ethnocentric approach, arguing that cultures are not so readily reduced into
pro-democratic vs. anti-democratic
dichotomies. Moore (1966) argued that democracy required a specific type of
macro-social conditions or 'social structure'. Therborn (1983) challenged
Moore's proposition, that democracy is advanced by a well-developed
bourgeoisie, and argued that democracy is instead produced by a struggle
against the bourgeoisie. The third wave of democracy, which began in the mid-1970s, included
many countries lacking these socioeconomic preconditions and coincided with a
renewed interest in states and institutional structures. Scholars such as
Skocpol (1979), Stepan (1978), and Trimberger (1978) were "bringing the state
back in" to the center of comparative political analysis at the same time as
democratic transitions were sweeping across the globe. Similarly, many of those
analyzing transitions to democracy adopted a framework of analysis that looked
at the institutional framework or transition process and the strategies pursued
by various elite actors. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1988)
argued that democratization was primarily a process of negotiation between
authoritarian and pro-democratic elites. Thus, recent scholars emphasize the
need for institutional arrangements and agreements by which the elite crafted
democracy through a series of agreements about constitutional design, timing,
and trade-offs (Di Palma 1990). 2.2.
Democratic Stability
Though recent literature emphasizes the concept of democratic
consolidation, my study uses the more basic concept of democratic stability. Although the requirements for democratic
consolidation are often debated, most scholars agree that stability is a core
condition for democratic consolidation. Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz consider a
democracy stable when "the broad mass of the public and all significant actors
... believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for
their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine"
(1999, 4). My definition of democratic stability is more modest: democracy is
stable when the basic procedural democratic norms are consistently adhered to.
This means that electoral calendars are institutionalized -elections go ahead
as scheduled without interruptions. Elections must be free of fraud and losers
must accept their outcomes. Similarly, no actors attempt to overthrow the
democratic regime. In the simplest terms, there should be no coups d'tat or
other attempts to use extra-constitutional power to pursue political (or
personal) ambitions. I consider a democracy stable if it meets these
requirements for two consecutive elections. At its core, democratic consolidation refers to expectations that democracy will survive,
that it is immune to reversal (Schedler 1998). But endurance does not by itself
guarantee that a democracy is consolidated. A semi-democratic regime may also
enjoy long-term stability (O'Donnell 1996). Often, definitions of democratic
consolidation are closely linked to, and expand upon, procedural definitions of
democracy. The concept is meant to distinguish real democracy from procedural
faades or "diminished subtypes" of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997).
Essentially, democracy is consolidated if it meets the requirements for genuine
democracy as well as those necessary for its long-term sustainability. Linz and Stepan (1996) consider democracy consolidated when it has
become "the only game in town." Their commonly used definition focuses on five
arenas: civil society, political society, the rule of law, a usable state
bureaucracy, and economic society. For them, a consolidated democracy requires
certain behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional conditions: behaviorally,
no actors try to (violently) overthrow the democratic regime; attitudinally,
there is broad public support for democratic procedures and institutions;
constitutionally, all actors are subject to and accept the resolution of
conflict using democratic institutions. For democracy to be the only game in town, the political and social
elite must first agree to play by democratic rules. Elites and elite pacts play
a critical role in the democratization process (Higley and Gunther 1992).
Democracy has fared better in countries where elite pacts were prevalent than
in those where they were not. The nature of elite pacts also had important consequences
for democracy in Latin America (Peeler 1998). Elite consensus about the pace of
democratization and the basic nature of the emerging democratic system help
convince them to play the democratic game. But members of the elite may also
agree to slow down the pace of democracy or to settle for a semi-democratic
regime instead. Whitehead's (2001) concept of democratic viability provides another way to assess democratization in a
long-term political and historical perspective. A democracy is viable if it is
capable of surviving in its environment. Related to endurance, the concept of
viability points to factors that may, in the long term, threaten democracy. A
democracy may be consolidated but not viable; it may simply be democracy by default
if actors have accepted democracy only because non-democratic alternatives are
no longer available.[4]
To be viable, democracy and its institutions must enjoy widespread legitimacy.
This requires effective democratic institutions, especially those that produce
moderated politics and strong links between institutions and civil society.
Democratic viability also requires that political institutions of liberal
democracy be able to solve the critical problems of their society (Margolis
1979). Thus, democratic viability is linked to democracy's performance, its
ability to resolve key social, economic, and political problems. The concept of democratic viability distinguishes between factors that
aid democratic stability from those that promote democracy for the long term.
Procedural definitions of democracy often emphasize stability. But political
stability and the institutionalization of political norms may, in the long
term, threaten democracy. If political institutions are unable to articulate
social demands or represent civil society, democracy may not be viable and may
eventually break down. For democracy to endure, political democracy must be
both institutionalized and flexible enough to bring in new players and deepen
democracy over time (Huntington 1968). My study, however, does not seek to predict whether Bolivia's democracy
will endure nor does it argue that its democracy is consolidated. Though some
argue that Bolivia's democracy is already consolidated (Whitehead 2001; Mayorga
1992; Linz 1994), what is important is that democratic procedural norms have
been uninterrupted for two decades. The same cannot be said of Ecuador or Peru.
This study aims to discern what factors best explain Bolivia's unexpected democratic
stability. 2.3.
Democracy and Political Institutions
Because elite agreements are so important, much of the recent
scholarship focuses on political institutions, the commonly accepted norms and
rules of behavior that frame elite (as well as mass) behavior. These include
formal institutions, such as electoral rules or constitutional provisions
regulating executive-legislative relations; they also include informal rules,
such as those regulating bargaining and coalition building. Democracy requires
institutions that encourage moderated bargaining and limited veto power, while
also ensuring effective governance and the authority of the state, especially
the rule of law. Much recent literature on democracy in Latin America has
adopted an institutionalist perspective that sees institutions as strongly
influencing political outcomes, including democratic consolidation and
endurance. Thus, some literature on democratization has focused on
"constitutional engineering" (Sartori 1997) or "getting the institutions right"
(Diamond, et al. 1999). A focus on political institutions is consistent with approaches to the
study of democratization that adopt procedural definitions of democracy.
Political institutions, the formal and informal norms of political behavior,
dictate how power and authority is exercised in a democratic polity. The
institutions that determine how leaders are selected and how the rights of
minorities are protected are essential to the very meaning of modern
representative democracy. If democracy is to be stable, of course, then the
institutions that define democratic politics must also be stable and commonly accepted.
My study adopts a historical institutionalist perspective that defines
institutions as "the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity" (Hall and
Taylor 1996, 938). This approach contrasts with rational choice
institutionalism, which assumes actors have predetermined interests and design
institutions to maximize those interests (North 1993). Historical
institutionalism focuses on both formal and informal institutions and readily
admits that political outcomes are influenced by historical and cultural factors.
Earlier decisions have consequences, both expected and unexpected, on the
strategies and choices available in the future. Historical institutionalists
accept rational choice's assumption that individuals act strategically, but
argue that individual interests, choices, and strategies are also affected by
their historical institutional context (March and Olsen 1989). The
historical-institutionalist perspective I adopt also differs from a sociological
institutionalism that more broadly analyzes social conventions and customs
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991). This latter approach, however, is inherently
conservative and less able to explain institutional change than either rational
choice or historical institutionalism. A historical institutionalist perspective is useful for a study of
Bolivian democracy because Bolivian actors did not design their institutions.
Bolivian democracy was inaugurated in 1982 under the 1967 Constitution. Thus,
the Bolivian elite was constrained by an institutional framework they did not
construct. Though not implemented at the time, the 1967 Constitution (drafted
during the 1964-69 Barrientos military government) outlined the basic rules for
democratic elections. A new constitution was not adopted until 1995, though it
did not significantly alter the country's basic institutional framework.[5]
Nevertheless, Bolivia's democratization was a dramatic shift from the previous
political norms. Since 1982, Bolivians have created a new democratic
institutional framework. My study highlights four political institutions that may explain
democratic stability: 1) the electoral system, 2) the political party system,
3) executive-legislative relations, and 4) informal coalition-building rules.
Though each institution has independent effects on democratic stability, they
also interact in complex ways. Of the four, only the electoral system is
strictly a formal institution outlined in specific constitutional and legal
provisions. The electoral system also strongly affects the other institutions,
especially the political party system and the number and type of parties. The
least formal of these is the set of norms governing coalition building. Though
influenced by electoral outcomes, coalition building among the political elite
requires trust and the willingness to cooperate and bargain with one another. 2.3.1.
Electoral Systems and Electoral Laws
Elections are an essential feature of modern representative democracy.
In truth, "the democratic process is indeed encapsulated in elections and
electing" (Sartori 1987, 86). Of course, we must beware of the electoralist
fallacy: while elections are a necessary condition for democracy, they are not
a sufficient condition (Linz and Stepan 1996). Nevertheless, free and fair elections
allow citizens to choose between competing political elites and different
policy options. Electoral systems make voting possible by stipulating, among
other things, the number and types of offices contested, how votes are cast,
and the counting rules used to determine winners and losers. Essentially,
democracy becomes the only game in town when all actors agree to use competitive
elections as the mechanism to decide who wields power in the polity. Implied,
of course, is the stipulation that political actors agree to the specific
electoral rules and that losers agree to respect electoral outcomes. The procedural model of democracy relies on elections to make popular
self-government possible in large political systems. While citizens of large,
modern polities are no longer able to directly decide political issues, they
can freely select their own representatives. Through competitive elections,
citizens are able to influence public policy, articulate their interests, and
hold government officials accountable (Manin 1997). Although democracies may also
use referenda, ballot initiatives, or other electoral mechanisms, this study
focuses on national-level elections for the executive and legislature. The kind of electoral system used reflects the elementary foundations
of the political system. Each counting rule aims to build a different type of
majority or popular consensus. Different types of counting rules, however, vary
significantly in their approaches. While single-member district systems are
often meant to build elective majorities, proportional representation (PR)
systems are usually designed to increase minority representation. By dictating
how votes are translated into seats, different electoral systems affect citizen
and elite behavior by providing different strategic choices (Lijphart 1994). Electoral systems also strongly affect other political institutions,
especially the party system. Duverger (1954) was one of the first to outline
the relationship between electoral systems and party systems. PR systems tend
to be associated with multiparty systems; simple majority systems tend to
coincide with two-party systems. Majoritarian systems have a constraining
effect on voters and a reductive effect on the number of parties (Sartori
1997). By limiting the possibilities that smaller parties can win, majoritarian
electoral systems encourage voters and elites to limit their ballot choices. In
contrast, PR systems, especially those with larger district magnitudes and
lower thresholds, encourage a greater number of parties. Voters are more likely
to expect their party to win some representation; consequently, minority
parties are more likely to campaign rather than support a larger party. 2.3.2.
Political Parties and Party Systems
Modern representative democracy is impossible without political parties
and an institutionalized party system. Political parties link elites to voters,
organize and articulate public political discourse, help make representatives
accountable, and allow for challenges to political authority. Political parties
are naturally consistent with democracy -even direct democracy. Finley (1985)
and Manin (1997) point out that the Athenian social elite played an important
role.[6]
Although any Athenian citizen was able to voice a proposal in the Assembly,
specially trained orators often served as de facto representatives. Of course, modern political parties
are more highly organized and differentiated than simple political factions. In
contrast to other political arrangements, electoral democracy allows citizens
to choose the elites who will govern on their behalf. Political parties allow
voters to organize behind elites they believe will best represent them. Because an institutionalized party system is indispensable for
democracy, significant attention should be given to the development of stable
party systems in new democracies (Lipset 2000). A party system is institutionalized if parties are more than temporary or personal
electoral vehicles. Institutionalized parties are linked to, and legitimately
represent, important social groups and constituencies; they should coincide
with the significant social cleavages and retain relatively stable bases of
electoral support. Party systems also give voters intellectual shortcuts;
voters should be able to identify basic policy tendencies of political parties
or, at the very least, who their core leaders are and what they stand for. If
parties are not institutionalized, if they are merely empty labels used
haphazardly during elections, then voters are essentially voting randomly and
without clearly articulated preferences. Political parties also train and prepare potential government teams.
Unlike other civic associations or interest groups, parties deliberately seek
to place their members into government positions. When in power, parties are
expected to translate the party's program into government policies. Thus, the
recruitment and training of political elites is an important function of
political parties. Because voters tend to hold parties accountable for their
management of government, parties have incentives to nominate capable and
responsible candidates for election. Though electoral systems influence the party system's character,
political parties and party systems also have independent social and historical
roots. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that Western European party systems
froze in the 1920s before the full impact of electoral democracy. Because party
systems in large part reflect and articulate a society's cleavages, the
underlying social structure also influences the number and type of political
parties in the party system. These historical legacies were especially felt in
new democracies. Political parties were common in Latin America, even in
countries with little or no history of democracy and democratic elections. The
ability of these parties to learn to play the electoral game proved crucial. Finally, political parties and party systems have an impact on the
political process between elections. Competitive elections produce both a
government (the winners) and an opposition (the losers). When they agree to
play by the electoral rules, political parties must concede the right of the
winners to exercise political power. Thus, the way parties work together after
an election is important, not only for day-to-day government, but also for the continued
survival of democratic politics. In large part, how political parties interact
is shaped by the constitutional structure, especially those regulating
executive-legislative relations. 2.3.3.
Executive-Legislative Relations
Modern democratic systems make clear distinctions between the executive
and legislative powers. Even in parliamentary systems, where the prime minister
is technically a member of parliament, voters recognize that the prime minister
and his or her cabinet wields the executive power, that is, the execution of
government policy. The relationship between the executive and legislature can
vary significantly, both between presidential and parliamentary systems and
within them. These differences are often stipulated by constitutional structures;
they are also, however, affected by the electoral system, the party system, and
informal coalition-building norms. Like electoral systems, the norms regulating
executive-legislative relations reflect underlying assumptions of the political
system. The two basic constitutional types stem from different views of democracy. Parliamentary systems closely bind the executive and legislature and
reflect a populist theory of democracy. The populist theory identifies
democracy with popular sovereignty and majority rule (Dahl 1956). Popular
sovereignty is reflected in the election of a representative assembly.
Executives in parliamentary systems are not elected by direct popular vote, but
rather by parliament; the ability of parliament to call for a vote of confidence
also makes the executive dependent on legislative support. Although
parliamentary systems do tend to focus executive power in the cabinet, rather
than the legislature as a whole, parliamentary cabinets are more collegial and
spread decision-making beyond the prime minister (Lijphart 1999). In contrast, presidential systems keep executive and legislative powers
separate and reflect a Madisonian theory democracy. The Madisonian theory
reflects an effort to restrain majority (and minority) tyranny by building
compromise between competing interests (Dahl 1956). Presidential systems hold
separate elections for the executive and legislature, who may represent
different and competing social groups or interests. Thus, unlike in
parliamentary systems, divided government is a very real possibility in
presidential systems. Although executive power is centralized within the chief
executive, the legislature retains its independent base of support and can
check the president. Similarly, presidents can exercise veto power and restrain
legislative power. The ability of different political parties to work together
is therefore critical in presidential systems. Linz (1990; 1994) argued that presidential systems are inherently
unstable and less likely to lead to democratic stability than are parliamentary
systems. Linz's critique focused on the two most prominent features of
presidential systems: dual legitimacy
and temporal rigidity. Separate
elections for the executive and legislature give each a competing claim to legitimacy;
since each is popularly elected, "no democratic principle can decide who
represents the will of the people" (Linz 1994, 7). Similarly, because
presidential systems do not allow for votes of confidence and tend to limit
terms of office, they are less flexible than parliamentary systems; popular and
effective governments cannot extend their mandate while voters are stuck with
unpopular and ineffective governments until the next election. When presidents
and legislatures disagree, dual legitimacy and temporal rigidity can collide
dangerously. Stepan and Skach argue that the conflict between executive and
legislative powers inherent in presidentialism "systematically contributes to
impasses and democratic breakdowns" (1993, 19). Like Linz, they argue that the
failure of presidential democracy explains why democracy has not succeeded in
Latin America, where most countries adopted presidential systems of government.
Historically, conflicts between executives and legislatures were often solved
by the military, acting as the poder moderador. More recently, presidential democracy is criticized
for producing executives with authoritarian tendencies who claim to rule in the
name of the people against the legislature (O'Donnell 1994). Nevertheless, most new democracies have adopted some type of
presidential system. This is especially true in Latin America, where no country
has yet adopted a parliamentary system. A further problem is that many new
democracies have adopted PR electoral systems for their legislature, which tend
to increase the number of political parties and make presidents less effective.
Again, Latin American electoral systems have followed this pattern closely.
Still, subtle differences in the design and operation of presidential systems
are significant. Differences in types of executive decree powers, for example,
affect how legislatures and presidents interact. The relationship between executives and legislatures is deeply affected
by other institutional factors. Jones (1995) demonstrates that presidential
democracy fares better when electoral laws can provide executives with
majorities or near-majorities. Similarly, Shugart and Carey (1992) point out
that different presidential systems balance executive and legislative power differently.
Electoral systems intervene into the working of executive-legislative relations
and affect them as much as do formal proscriptions separating their powers.
Electoral systems also offer different incentives for building inter-party
coalitions, which affect the relationship between executives and legislatures. 2.3.4.
Coalition-Building Rules
Coalition-building rules are informal, commonly accepted norms of
behavior that specify how different political parties can collaborate. Although
liberal democracy relies on political parties that vie for power in competitive
elections, coalitions allow rival parties to reduce some of the antagonism of
electoral politics by coming together to build policy consensus. A key element
of democracy is the principle of majority rule. Governing majorities can be
built through coalition-building processes that allow for different political
parties to come together through deliberation and agreement. While formal institutions cannot make coalitions inevitable, they can
make them more likely. Institutions offer incentive structures that can either
encourage or discourage cooperation between rival elites. Electoral systems
that promote antagonistic campaign strategies limit the possibility that
political elites will work cooperatively after the election. Coalition-building rules may be highly institutionalized and broadly
based, such as in consociational norms that rely on elite cooperation (Lijphart
1984; 1999). Consociational power-sharing agreements between elite cartels are
credited with stabilizing liberal politics in societies with deep social
cleavages, such as Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. In pluralist
societies, the principle of majority rule effectively becomes majority tyranny
if the alternation of power is not possible. One danger with consociationalism,
however, is that it can lock power-sharing agreements into place for too long.
This is especially true if cleavage structures change and new groups do not
have access to political power. In Latin America, consociational agreements in
Colombia and Venezuela were credited with preventing authoritarianism. Still,
bipartisan agreements in both countries excluded political movements that
emerged in the 1970s; the democratic crises in both countries have been in
great part blamed on their consociational elite agreements (McCoy 1999;
Gonzlez and Crdenas 1998). Other types of coalition-building rules may be narrower and less
static, such as the ad hoc governing coalitions common in parliamentary
systems. Because executives are elected by the legislature in parliamentary
democracy, multi-party coalitions are necessary whenever no single party wins a
simple majority. Of course, different parties only need to agree to vote
together to elect a prime minister; there is no reason why parties cannot
subsequently return to the role of opposition. Governing coalitions, in which
two or more different political parties agree to share and exercise power together,
are nevertheless the norm in parliamentary systems. In such coalitions, the
various member parties agree to share cabinet and ministerial positions between
them. In many cases, coalition partners tend to be fairly stable and
predictable, with some parties commonly joining together, often due to
ideological closeness. Coalition governments have been relatively common in
Latin America, though their character and frequency across countries is heavily
affected by electoral and party systems (Deheza 1998). Differences in coalition norms influence executive-legislative
relations. In government coalitions of the type common in parliamentary
systems, legislation and government policy is routinely hammered out between
the coalition parties before going to the legislature for approval. Similarly,
majority coalition governments may decide to grant the executive discretionary
decree powers over wide policy areas. 3.
Bolivia's Democratic Experience
Assessments of Bolivian democracy are mixed, despite its widely
recognized stability. The normalization of politics around consensual practices
and moderated elite bargaining point to the possibility that Bolivia's
democracy was already consolidated by the late 1980s (Mayorga 1992). In
contrast, these same elite agreements may merely be a continuation of
patrimonial and dominated-dominated political discourse (Gamarra 1996).
Although this study does not directly consider whether Bolivia's democracy is
consolidated, it explores the relationship that political institutions have on
democratic stability. This study aims to test whether Bolivia's democratic
stability was the result of its unique political institutions (as Mayorga
argues) or if it was caused by other factors, such as elite consensus (as
Gamarra proposes). I also consider two other variables that may account for
political stability: 1) the historical legacies of the 1952 National Revolution
and 2) the role of particular individuals in building democracy. 3.1.
The Transition to Democracy
Bolivia's democracy was inaugurated in 1982 after a long and difficult
transition. Although several civilian governments ruled throughout its history,
none of these qualify as democratic. The transition to democracy began in 1978
when then-dictator Hugo Bnzer Surez stepped down in favor of elections. The
Democratic Popular Union (UDP), led by Hernn Siles Zuazo, won the 1978
election but was prevented from holding power when Bnzer's chosen successor,
Juan Pereda Asbum, launched a military coup and declared the elections invalid.
After another military coup, by David Padilla, elections were also held in 1979
and 1980, though no presidential candidate won a majority of the popular vote;
parliament was unable to elect a president in either election and chose instead
to elect a legislator as interim president until new elections could be held
within a year.[7] This
introduced a period of extreme political crisis as one military junta replaced
another until the last junta stepped down in 1982.[8] After civilian rule was restored in 1982, the parliament elected in
1980 chose Siles Zuazo, the UDP presidential candidate and plurality winner in
all three elections. Siles Zuazo's UDP, a broad coalition of left-of-center
parties, came to power at the beginning of the nation's worst economic crisis.
As the debt crisis of the mid-1980s spiraled out of control, the UDP fell
apart. By 1985, Siles Zuazo's vice-president, Jaime Paz Zamora, had effectively
abandoned the president and taken his party, the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), into the opposition. Only the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) remained steadfast; but its ideological commitments
-along with its ability to mobilize the Bolivian workers, especially the
strategically important miners- pressured Siles Zuazo against the difficult
economic policy choices the situation required. Unable to solve the key problem
of hyperinflation, Siles Zuazo stepped down and called for elections a year
ahead of schedule. The Bolivian left was soundly defeated in the 1985 elections, with most
votes split between Bnzer's center-right Democratic National Action (ADN) and the centrist National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR).[9]
The effective collapse of the Bolivian revolutionary left after 1985 is
significant. Bolivia's left had deep historical roots and was highly militant;
the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) and the Moscow-line Revolutionary
Party of the Left (PIR) traced
their roots back to the 1930s (Roln 1999). The Bolivian Labor Confederation
(COB), the federation of Bolivian
worker's unions, had been a backbone of the 1952-68 Revolutionary governments
and the most powerful force (outside of the military) in Bolivian politics for
most of the twentieth century. In post-1985 Bolivian politics, only MIR has
managed to survive.[10]
Similarly, though the COB is still able to mobilize significant support, it has
not come close to dominating political discourse as it once did. The 1985 election gave Bnzer a plurality over the MNR candidate, Paz
Estenssoro, but it did not give him a clear majority. Under Bolivia's electoral
system, presidential candidates must win by a majority. The potential stalemate
was ended after parliament implemented Article 90 of the Bolivian constitution,
which calls for the legislature to select the president in the event that no
candidate wins a simple majority of the popular vote. Because many Bolivians
were uneasy about giving the former military ruler control of the government,
especially so soon after the return to democracy, the MNR was able to convince
legislators to vote for Paz Estenssoro. Barely two months after parliament elected Paz Estenssoro, in October
1985, the MNR founder entered into a political alliance with Bnzer. The "Pact
for Democracy" ensured the new president a legislative supermajority. This was
critical in order to pass urgently needed emergency measures to deal with
hyperinflation nearing 25,000 percent and the general economic crisis. In
exchange, the Paz Estenssoro government implemented many of the neoliberal
economic reforms favored by ADN.[11]
This New Economic Policy (NEP) reduced inflation to just eleven percent in one
year and stabilized the economy while also fundamentally dismantling much of
the previous state-centered development model (Sachs and Morales 1988).
Ironically, it was Paz Estenssoro and the MNR that had originally created this
statist economic model after coming to power in the 1952 National Revolution.
Subsequent governments have also continued neoliberal economic policies. 3.2.
Building Democratic Stability, 1985-present
The 1985 election established the pattern for democratic politics in
Bolivia. Since 1985, no president has been elected directly; parliament has
elected the president in each election. Parliamentary election of the president
has also made coalition government unavoidable. To win support for their
presidential candidate, parties have built governing coalitions under complex
political pacts. In intense inter-party negotiations during the brief month
between the election and the swearing in of the new president on 6 August,
parties agree to share cabinet and other ministerial posts as well as to adopt
policy packages in exchange for parliamentary support for their candidates. For the most part, these pacts have
held surprisingly well, making Bolivian governments since 1985 true coalition
governments. Stongly disciplined political parties have guaranteed every
Bolivian president since 1985 a working legislative majority. The MNR-ADN alliance, however, did not last into the 1989 elections.
Though MNR and ADN had signed a secret addendum to the Pact for Democracy in
May 1988 under which the MNR agreed to back Bnzer in the 1989 election, the
new leader of the MNR, Gonzalo Snchez de Lozada, chose to run for president.
As Paz Estenssoro's Planning Minister, and responsible for most of the economic
stabilization reforms, Snchez de Lozada hoped that his popularity would propel
him to an electoral victory. Bnzer took Snchez de Lozada's decision to run
for the presidency personally, sparking a bitterly contested election campaign. The MNR won a narrow plurality in 1989 with 25.6 percent of the vote.
Bnzer, who placed second with 25.2 percent, was unwilling to cede the
presidency a second time to the MNR. Meanwhile, MIR had doubled its vote share
from 1985 and placed third with 21.8 percent. Under Article 90, parliament was
able to select from among the top three candidates. Consequently, all three
parties pursued the presidency. Opposed to the neoliberal economic policies of
Snchez de Lozada, the left-of-center MIR was not prepared to back MNR. Paz
Zamora and MIR were also unwilling to back ADN since Bnzer's military regime
had brutally repressed the left during his military regime. The stalemate was
ended when Bnzer ordered his party to vote for the third place MIR-candidate,
Paz Zamora. The result was another political pact, the "Patriotic Accord" (AP),
an unanticipated alliance of the traditional right and left against the center.
Although Paz Zamora took the presidency in 1989, Bnzer and ADN held considerable
power. Under the AP agreement, half of the cabinet and ministerial appointments
were given over to ADN. Similarly, most government policy was initiated in the
Committee of the Patriotic Accord, chaired by Bnzer. The heavy reliance on ADN
for a legislative majority partially explained why, despite having campaigned
against the neoliberal economic model imposed under Paz Estenssoro, Paz Zamora
continued the same neoliberal policy orientation initiated by the 1985-89
MNR-ADN government. Although originally an uneasy alliance, Paz Zamora and Bnzer
were able to reign in their parties and hold the coalition together with
considerable discipline. Like the MNR-ADN agreement, the AP accord called for
MIR to support Bnzer in the next elections. In 1993, Bnzer again ran for the presidency, this time under a single
AP electoral list binding ADN and MIR. Accusations of corruption within the Paz
Zamora government, however, dogged Bnzer's presidential campaign. At the same
time, two new populist parties, Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA) and Solidarity Civic Union (UCS), cut deeper into the anti-incumbent vote. Popular
resentment against the neoliberal economic policies was especially heavy among
the urban poor. Led by the charismatic media mogul Carlos Palenque, CONDEPA
captured most of the Aymara vote in La Paz and El Alto, the large slum city
attached to the capital. Max Fernndez, owner of the largest national brewery,
propelled UCS by building schools, hospitals, and even distributing food and
consumer goods throughout the countryside. Snchez de Lozada won an overwhelming plurality in the 1993 elections
with 35.6 percent of the vote. Bnzer's combined ADN-MIR list, in contrast,
took a mere 21.1 percent -less even than the third-place MIR had won on its own
in 1989. Shortly after the election, Bnzer conceded defeat and the presidency
was securely in the hands of Snchez de Lozada and the MNR. Although the 1993
election gave the MNR a comfortable majority in the Senate with 17 of the 30
seats, it had won only 51 seats in the 130-seat House of Deputies. To secure a
legislative majority, Snchez de Lozada pieced together a coalition an
agreement known as the "Pact for Governability" with the small leftist Free
Bolivia Movement (MBL) and the
populist UCS. Part of Snchez de Lozada's electoral appeal stemmed from his alliance
with one of the most significant campesino (indigenous peasant) parties, the Tupaj Katari
Revolutionary Movement of Liberation (MRTKL).
Although the kataristas never won
more than three percent of the vote on their own, the inclusion of Vctor Hugo
Crdenas, the MRTKL leader, as the vice-presidential candidate for the
MNR-MRTKL electoral front appealed to millions of campesino voters. The MNR-MRTKL victory made Crdenas the first
indigenous vice-president in Bolivia's history. Under their "Plan for Everyone"
platform, Snchez de Lozada and Crdenas campaigned with the promise of social
and institutional reforms to improve the condition for Bolivia's historically
neglected indigenous majority. The Snchez de Lozada government implemented numerous second-generation
reforms meant to modernize the economy and decentralize Bolivia's political
system. One of these, the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), divided the country into 311 popularly elected
municipal governments. The law had important implications. First, it introduced
democratic politics to the local level; previously only the major cities held
mayoral elections. Second, the LPP also guaranteed state resources -20 percent
of the national budget- to be allocated on a per capita basis to each municipal
government. This brought badly needed economic resources to long-neglected rural
communities. Table
1. Presidents and government coalitions, 1982 to present
Sources: Based on data provided by Corte Nacional Electoral. Notes: 1CONDEPA was expelled from Bnzer's government coalition on 6 August 1998. Other programs initiated by the Snchez de Lozada regime included a
variety of socioeconomic reforms. The package of amendments to the constitution
included inclusive language that identified Bolivia as a "pluricultural and
multiethnic" republic, broad recognition of indigenous rights, and lowered the
voting age from 21 to 18. Like the LPP, the reform of the agrarian law (INRA)
and the Law of Administrative Decentralization meant to streamline and
modernize Bolivia's political system while making local resources more readily
available to citizens. Finally, the Capitalization Law further liberalized the
national economy by allowing foreign investors to capitalize half the stock of
state owned enterprises. In contrast to simple privatization, foreign investors
were to invest in equal proportion to the corporation's market value,
essentially doubling the value of Bolivian corporations. The capitalization of
strategic public enterprises was unpopular among many Bolivians who saw the MNR
regime as giving away much of the state sector to foreign capital. Bnzer, again ADN's presidential candidate, won a narrow plurality in
the 1997 elections over the MNR's Juan Carlos Durn. With the support of MIR,
CONDEPA, and UCS, Bnzer assumed the presidency on 6 August 1997. The
centerpiece of Bnzer's foreign policy (in terms of US-Bolivian relations) was
an escalation of the US-backed war on drugs in Bolivia. The campaign was
successful, practically eradicating for-export coca crops by 2001, despite
several violent confrontations with organized cocaleros, the coca-growing peasants of the Chapare region. Due
to health reasons, Bnzer left the presidency in 2001 and turned power over to
his vice president, Jorge Quiroga Ramirez. 3.3.
Explaining Democratic Stability
One possible explanation for Bolivia's democratic stability might be
its unique political institutions. Since 1985, Bolivia's political institutions
have merged into a system of "parliamentarized presidentialism" (Mayorga 1997).
The system is characterized by: 1) a fused-ballot PR electoral system; 2)
congressional election of the executive; and 3) informal coalition rules that
provide presidents with legislative majorities. Bolivian voters choose from
party lists headed by presidential candidates (fused-ballot PR). Presidential
candidates win directly only if their list wins a majority. If not, the new
legislature elects a president from among the front-runners. To gain support
for candidates, parties join coalitions in exchange for shares of state
patronage. Because no party list has yet won a simple majority, parliamentarized
presidentialism has become institutionalized. Three other possible explanations must also be considered: 1) the role
of the political class, 2) the impact of historical legacies, and 3) the role
of key individual statesmen. A key moment in Bolivia's history is the National
Revolution. Launched by the MNR on 9 April 1952, it fundamentally altered
Bolivia's political landscape (Malloy and Thorn 1971). If Bolivia's revolution
is consolidated, democratic stability may be facilitated by broad social and
elite consensus around the political discourse of revolutionary nationalism (as
in Mexico). Bolivia's democratic stability might also be the product of the
role of elites. Determined elites could, possibly, make democracy work under
any circumstances and institutional arrangements. The actions of such elite
personalities as Siles Zuazo, Bnzer, or Paz Estenssoro, may better explain democratic
stability. Finally, political stability in Bolivia might be a function of
patrimonialism among the political class, as Gamarra argues. If a small
political class benefiting from government privilege maintains elite stability,
then Bolivian democracy may be stable, but it is not representative and faces
limited prospects for long-term durability. 3.3.1.
Parliamentarized Presidentialism
The key element of parliamentarized presidentialism is the electoral
system. The fused ballot is, essentially, a parliamentary ballot; it closely
binds presidents to the legislature and eliminates the problem of dual
legitimacy plaguing many presidential systems (Linz 1994). The simple structure
of the Bolivian ballot fuses the election of the executive and legislature into
one singular vote choice (resembling ballots in parliamentary systems). When
voting, Bolivian citizens receive a simple multi-color, multi-sign ballot that
has the name of each presidential candidate along with the name, signs, and
colors of their party. Voters are then given a pencil and simply asked to mark
the box for their presidential candidate. Seats in the lower and upper chambers
of the legislature are then given out in proportion to vote shares. If a
candidate wins a majority of the popular vote, he or she is automatically
chosen president. The 1994 constitutional reforms, which went into effect in the 1997
election, did not significant alter Bolivia's political system. Parliament is
now limited to selecting from among the top two (rather than three)
presidential candidates.[12]
The practice of building coalitions has gone largely unaffected and the change
may instead have helped to streamline the process. The introduction of a
German-style multi-member proportional (MMP) electoral system also does not
seem to have significantly altered the political system. Although MMP allows
for half the lower house to be elected in single-member districts, the system
is still a PR system since the other half of the seats are apportioned in
compensatory fashion. The upper house is still elected under the old PR formula.
Bolivia's electoral system also calls for the legislature to elect the
president if no candidate wins a majority, rather than a second round popular
election. No presidential candidate has yet won a popular majority and it seems
highly unlikely that any will in the near future. The legislature has chosen
the president in every election since 1985 after intense inter-party bargaining
and negotiation. Here, informal coalition building rules play an important
role. The legislature could simply choose to elect a president without building
a formal governing coalition. Instead, every government since 1985 has involved
a formal power-sharing agreement between coalition partners. These coalitions
have provided each president with a sustained and disciplined legislative majority. 3.3.2.
The Role of the Political Class
Gamarra and Mayorga both agree that the normalization of political
pacts is a key factor in Bolivia's political stability. They disagree, however,
on the origins and long-term implications of these pacts. Where Mayorga (1997)
sees parliamentarized presidentialism as evolving from a combination of
institutional incentives and political learning, Gamarra (1994) suggests that
elite cooperation was made possible by the collapse of organized labor, elite
convergence around neoliberal economic politics, and patrimonialism. While
consociational practices "reveal a degree of political maturing of Bolivia's
political class," they also tend to exclude the opposition (Gamarra 1997). The political pacts characteristic of Bolivian politics since 1985 may,
as Gamarra suggests, be more the product of elite patrimonial bargaining than
on the incentive structures of political institutions. If so, stable politics
in Bolivia may simply revolve around an actively engaged political class made
up professional politicians and the small middle class elite that lives off of
politics -this includes high and mid-level professional bureaucrats and party
leaders- whose careers depend on the success of their political parties. Bolivia's political parties pose a key question. Several Bolivian
social scientists have called for institutional reforms to improve the weak
links between political parties and civil society (Rojas and Zuazo 1996;
Tornado and Exeni 1994; F. Mayorga and Paz 1999). If parties have weak
connections to civil society, the elite bargaining arrangements that supported
governmental stability since 1985 have little to do with institutionalized
political parties and more to do with strong caudillos who command their supporters' obedience. If so, a
lack of representation could erode support for democracy in the long term.
Survey evidence suggests Bolivian voters support democracy in principle, though
they have negative evaluations about Bolivia's democracy in practice (Lazarte
1993; Rojas and Verdesoto 1997). Especially negative are assessments of the
formal institutions of democracy and their representative character. Table 2. Current vote
and seat shares for Bolivian political parties
Sources: Based on data provided by Corte Nacional Electoral. The growth of two populist parties, UCS and CONDEPA, in the 1990s is significant.
Both parties have mounted effective electoral challenges to the traditional parties.
Led by highly charismatic populist leaders, both seemed to be anti-system alternatives.
Neither party has played a destabilizing role, however, and they have instead
been brought into the normal political discourse by the political system
(Mayorga 1995). Bolivia's political institutions provide opportunities for the
accommodation of such new political forces. UCS and CONDEPA have joined MNR,
MIR, and ADN as the major political parties. They have also emerged as
potential kingmaker parties able to shift the balance of power from the two
political poles, one centered on the MNR and the other on the ADN and MIR. 3.3.3.
Historical Legacies
A historical institutionalist perspective also considers the effect
historical legacies have on contemporary politics. These legacies form part of
the context within which political actors interact. Actors are constrained by
institutions (especially those they inherit rather than those they create or
redesign) as well as the historical lenses through which they view the costs
and incentives of institutional strategies. This study distinguishes between
political institutions and broader historical or contextual institutions.
Unlike political institutions (such as electoral systems) that constrain
actors' preferences in strategic ways, historical legacies (such as a social
revolution) alter actor's preferences indirectly by shaping the political
culture within which they interact. The 1952 National Revolution was one of only four successful social
revolutions in modern Latin America. The other three revolutions occurred in
Mexico (1910), Cuba (1959), and Nicaragua (1979). Most accounts of the 1952
Bolivian Revolution describe it as either "incomplete" or "unconsolidated"
(Selbin 1999; Malloy 1970). Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that the
core revolutionary project may have been accepted by a majority of Bolivia's
current political elites. Prior to 1952, the Bolivian state was dominated by a small oligarchy composed
of wealthy mining barons and owners of large landed estates (the latifundias). The nation's majority indigenous population was
excluded from political, social, and economic life. The small middle class and
the growing working class (especially miners) were similarly excluded from
politics. Through its control over the military, the Bolivian oligarchy was
able to suppress the increasingly militant labor movements that emerged in the
1920s. The Chaco War (1932-35) dramatically altered Bolivia's political
developments and was the major contributing factor to the 1952 Revolution.
After a series of clashes along the disputed Bolivia-Paraguay border, full war
broke out in 1932 after oil deposits were discovered in the region. The war was
an unmitigated disaster with more than 65,000 Bolivian casualties (one quarter
of combatants) and the loss of significant territory (doubling the size of
Paraguay). The end of the war led to a nation-wide rejection of the white
oligarchy, which was blamed for mismanaging war. Similarly, accusations that
the war had been fought on behalf of Standard Oil led to sweeping critiques of
the role of international capital in Bolivian national politics and helped
radicalize the small urban middle class. Immediately after the Chaco War,
disaffected mid-ranking officers usurped the civilian government. The MNR emerged in the aftermath of the Chaco War, along with other
radical and revolutionary movements. Led by young veterans and intellectuals,
most of these movements sought to create a new more progressive and modern
Bolivian state and society. In 1943, the MNR participated in a civil-military
coup, though it was soon eclipsed within the governing coalition. Only a few
years later, however, the MNR became the nation's most significant political
party. The MNR, campaigning behind an exiled Paz Estenssoro, won a clear
majority in the 1951 elections. After the military prevented the MNR from
assuming power, the MNR began preparing to take power by force. Bolivia's social revolution completely altered the country's power
structure. Backed by highly politicized and militant miners' militias, the
middle-class MNR came to power after a brief, three-day civil war that
shattered the armed forces and swept away the traditional landed oligarchy. On
9 April 1952, the MNR civilian militias led by Hernan Siles Zuazo took to the
streets of La Paz. The brief civil war was tipped in favor of the MNR after
organized miners militias joined the revolution, attacking loyalist military
forces throughout the country and marching on the capital. Only three days
after it began, the revolution was over and Paz Estenssoro returned from exile
to assume the presidency. Among its reforms, the MNR introduced universal adult suffrage,
nationalization of the mining industry and the creation of the COB, sweeping
land redistribution to the peasants, and a purge of the armed forces. Even
after the military seized power in 1964, it did not attempt to reverse or
challenge the central gains of the Bolivian Revolution.[13]
Essentially, many of the military rulers were members of the new Bolivian
military and represented the military cell of the MNR.[14]
The return to democracy also returned many of the revolution's key
actors (Siles Zuazo and Paz Estenssoro). Some even portray democratization as a
new "democratic revolution" (Bedregal 1996). None of the post-1982 political
parties could be classified as counter-revolutionary parties; most embrace its
myths and symbols and trace their lineage to the MNR and the revolution. UDP
was headed by Siles Zuazo, one of the founders of the MNR and leader of the movement's
center-left faction. MIR was founded by MNR's leftist student wing in 1971 and
headed by Paz Zamora (Paz Estenssoro's nephew). Even Bnzer's ADN is rooted in
the Revolution's political discourse of revolutionary nationalism and
represents some of the MNR's rightist factions.[15]
The absence in Bolivia of a genuine political right, coupled by the collapse of
the Marxist left in the 1980s, may help explain Bolivia's democratic stability.
The centrist character of Bolivian politics, with its agreement on basic
neoliberal policies, may be the result of the historical development of
Bolivia's party system, rather than due to the molding influence of its
electoral system. 3.3.4.
The Role of Individual Statesmen
There is no denying that the actions of individual political actors
have profound implications. Much of the democratic transition literature points
out the important role that key individuals had in promoting democracy (Linz
and Stepan 1996; Di Palma 1990). Bolivia's democratic stability might be the
product of powerful statesmen who may have made democracy work under even the
worst institutional conditions. Bolivian democracy may have been saved on different
occasions by the actions of key individuals. At least three individuals stand
out as important in Bolivia's democratic transition: Paz Estenssoro, Siles
Zuazo, and Bnzer. Paz Estenssoro was, arguably, the most important figure in
twentieth-century Bolivian politics. As a principal founder of the MNR in
1941-2 (along with Siles Zuazo), Paz Estenssoro was one of the chief architects
of the post-1952 Bolivian state. As leader of the MNR, Paz Estenssoro was also
among the most visible and important civilian elites involved in the democratic
transition process. His ability to discipline the MNR as it adopted neoliberal
economic reforms to solve the economic crisis in 1985 are also important
factors. Siles Zuazo's resignation one year ahead of schedule in 1985 in favor
of early elections saved Bolivia from enduring one more year with an
ineffective government during the nation's worst economic crisis. Bnzer's
support for the democratic process since 1978 may also have been crucial (Klein
1992). The former military dictator's willingness to concede the presidency to
Paz Estenssoro in 1985 (despite having won a plurality) and his dramatic
overture in 1989 towards MIR were critical junctures in Bolivia's democratic
development. Finally, younger, second-generation political elites may also play key
roles in supporting democratic stability. These may include politicians such as
Snchez de Lozada, Paz Zamora, and Max Fernandez (founder of UCS) or important
social, economic, or military players. 4.
Hypotheses
The following is my general hypothesis: Twenty years after Bolivia's transition to democracy,
the political system of parliamentarized presidentialism appears institutionalized.
Since 1985, every president has been elected by a parliamentary coalition.
These coalitions brought previously antagonistic groups of political elites
together into cooperative power-sharing arrangements. The literature suggests
at least four different explanations for Bolivia's democratic stability. Thus,
I specifically test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because the behavior of political elites is strongly
influenced by parliamentarized presidentialism's incentive structures. Hypothesis 1a. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because of its electoral system. Hypothesis 1b. Bolivian democracy has been stable because of its party system. Hypothesis 1c. Bolivian democracy has been stable because of its executive-legislative
relations. Hypothesis 1d. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because of its coalition-building rules. Hypothesis 2. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because of elite patrimonialism. Hypothesis 3. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because political elites share a common political
discourse inherited from the 1952 Revolution. Hypothesis 4. Bolivian
democracy has been stable because of the determination or willingness of key
political elites. I do not ignore the possibility that Bolivia's democratic stability may
stem from a combination of factors; nor do I dismiss the possibility that the
strength of the influence of explanatory variables may change over time. For
example, democratic stability may have, in the earliest stages, been more a
factor of the role of strong individuals (such as Paz Estenssoro and Bnzer) to
support democracy. Over time, however, the influence of individuals may have
waned, giving way to some other factor, such as patrimonial politics. Thus, my
research aims to uncover: 1) which of these factors were most influential in
different periods in time and 2) which factor is most important at this time. It is important to note the implications of each of the four central
hypotheses. If democratic stability is the product of Bolivia's unique
political institutions, it is possible that these institutions may similarly
support democratic stability in other similar cases. If stability is merely the
product of patrimonial politics, then Bolivia's democracy may not be viable.
The current status quo could easily be unsettled if any of the groups of
political elites decide it no longer wants to play the democratic game and
decides to mobilize either the military or the popular masses. If Bolivia's
democratic stability is a legacy of the 1952 Revolution, then it is possible
that Bolivia's democracy may endure but the lessons of the Bolivian case are only
generalizable to other countries that experienced social revolutions. If
Bolivia's democracy is stable because of the determination of key elites, then
Bolivian democracy is fragile at best (it may not survive the death of these
individuals) and the case is not generalizable (other than to call for powerful
pro-democratic elites). 5.
Research Design
This study is essentially a case study of Bolivia's democratic system
since 1982 based on fieldwork in that country. Nevertheless, I employ an
embedded case study approach, placing the Bolivian case within a comparative
perspective involving two similar countries, Ecuador and Peru. As a comparative
study, this study adopts a "most similar with different outcomes" (MSDO)
research design (Przeworski 1987). This approach assumes that the differences
in outcomes between cases should be explained by their differences, rather than
by their similarities. Placing a study of Bolivia's democratic stability within
the context of its Central Andean neighbors allows the research to narrow the
number of possible explanatory variables. 5.1.
Case Selection
The three Central Andean republics -Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru- were
among the first countries in the third wave of democracy. Nevertheless, their
political outcomes have been dramatically different. While Bolivia's democracy
has been stable and uninterrupted for two decades, democracy has not been
stable in Ecuador or Peru. Peru's experiment with democracy ended abruptly in
1992 after president Alberto Fujimori's military-backed autogolpe (self-coup) disbanded the legislature, purged the
judiciary, and suspended the constitution. Ecuadorian democracy has also had a
troubled road. Since 1979, the forced removal of two presidents from office,
the brief kidnapping of another by the military, and several military uprisings
and coups have kept the future of Ecuador's democracy uncertain. Comparing such
different outcomes along the dependent variable (democratic stability) is
possible because the cases are substantially similar. The Central Andean republics are classified as "developing" countries
by the United Nations Development Program (1999). They rank the lowest in South
America (except for Paraguay, which ranks among them) along socioeconomic
indicators such as annual per capita GDP, human development index, life
expectancy, and adult literacy rates. Along these indicators, Ecuador and Peru
are roughly comparable, while Bolivia is the least developed country in the region.
The overall failure of democracy in the Central Andes could be explained by
modernization theory to be a product of the region's low levels of
socioeconomic development. Here, the stability of Bolivia's democracy is
exceptional. Bolivia is the poorest and least developed of the Central Andean
republics, suggesting that socioeconomic variables alone cannot account for the
stability of democracy. The Central Andes is also culturally homogenous. Beyond a similar
Spanish cultural legacy, the three are the only South American countries to
have indigenous majorities. These Quechua- and Aymara-speaking populations have
been historically excluded from national political, economic, and cultural
life. All three countries also face similar obstacles to democracy. Neither
had any previous historical experience with democracy. They share a long
history of authoritarian rule. Although civilian governments have been common
at different times in all three countries, none of these would meet the
criteria for polyarchy. None of the three countries had an institutionalized
party system.[16] The three also share other similarities that may or may not have
positive effects on democratic stability. US and Western pressure in favor of
democracy has been strongly felt in the region. International pressure,
including from the Organization of American States, was powerful enough to
convince Fujimori to hold elections (though far from under ideal circumstances)
shortly after he seized power. The demonstration effects of other successful
democratizations in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay) were also
significant across the region. All three cases shared similar transition processes;
pacted transitions were the norm. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru have also been involved
in the US-led drug war, receiving significant military and technical support. Finally,
all three have embraced neoliberal economic policies. Comparing Bolivia with Ecuador and Peru allows for control of an
important variable: level of social unrest. While popular protest and unrest
has been common in all three countries, only Peru experienced a guerilla war
during the democratization process. No doubt the Shining Path guerrilla
movement played some role in the breakdown of democracy in Peru. 5.2.
Data and Method
My study aims to more rigorously tests the rival hypotheses presented
in the literature by Mayorga (stability as product of institutional design) and
Gamarra (stability as product of patrimonialism). In addition, I will test two
other possible explanations for Bolivia's democratic stability. The data I will
collect includes an extensive survey of political elites, content analysis of
the written historical record, and comparative analysis. A focus on political elites is consistent with the procedural
definitions of democracy. The electoral process puts politicians and their
political parties at the center of politics. How politicians behave -the
strategies they employ-significantly affects the democratic process. I will
consider elites including politicians, bureaucrats, business leaders, public
intellectuals, and military leaders. 5.2.1.
Content Analysis
To explore changes in elite behavior and attitude between 1982 and
2002, I will use qualitative and quantitative content analysis of published
statements. Content analysis allows me to determine if elite attitudes (individual
or collective) shifted over time in favor of moderated politics and
coalition-building norms. I do not expect elite statements to be true
representations of their attitudes. Instead, I will use content analysis to
interpret their statements. While I will focus on statements made in national newspapers, I will
also seek statements made in other sources, such as in party archives (when
made available), the Library of Parliament debate and voting records, and the
public intellectual literature. Newspaper and print media archives are readily
available at the Center for Documentation and Information (CEDOIN) in La Paz.
CEDOIN is an independent archive of print media; it maintains indexed copies of
articles from Bolivian newspapers and news magazines going back through the
1980s. Those relevant materials
for analysis include public statements made by politicians, party leaders,
public intellectuals, and leaders of social movements. Such statements are
included in direct quotations of such individuals in the press or statements
made by them in the media meant for public consumption.[17]
Public academic or intellectual literature is also important, since it provides
a written record of the public intellectual discourse over time.[18] The specific content categories I will measure include: 1) assessments of the quality
of democracy, 2) evaluation of individual political elites, 3) evaluation of democratic
institutions (e.g. the presidency,
the judiciary, the National Electoral Court), 4) evaluation of the electoral
system, 5) evaluation of political parties, 6) evaluation of the party system,
7) evaluation of social movements, and 8) evaluation of the 1952 Revolution.
Each statement about any of the eight categorized will be described along a
five-point scale from "negative" (0) to "positive" (4). Statements referring to
individuals will also be separated to distinguish the target of the statement
(the individual the statement refers to). The same procedure will be made for
similar statements (references to specific social movements, political parties,
ministries, or institutions). The recording unit for
analysis will be the entire statement, regardless of its length, made by one
individual or group. Since I am interested in analyzing how elite opinion
changed over time, recording the number of negative or positive sentences or
paragraphs in a single statement is not as important as noting whether the
statement as a whole negatively or positively assesses one of the content
categories. I am primarily interested in the distinguishing the change in opinion
for individual elites over time. However, some public statements may be made by
a group (such as a political party) to reflect its official position as a
group. If the author or spokesperson is a single individual, I will treat the
statement as coming for a single individual, even if the person claims to speak
for the whole party. If the statement has numerous authors (as in a public
manifesto or party position paper), I will treat the statement as being made by
the group. The time period for each
section of analysis will be the month. This provides 240 possible observations.[19]
While scores on the negative-positive evaluation scale will not be additive, I
will compile a cumulative index of the number of statements in each category
with the same score. I will seek to establish intercoder reliability by providing a sample of documents to other
researchers in Bolivia to code independently. If our coding is comparable, I
will continue independent coding. I may, however, ask Bolivian colleagues to
independently code especially difficult documents to ensure that I my coding is
reliable. Analysis of the written record has several advantages: 1) easy access
to the data, 2) the data is non-reactive, 3) allows for study across time, 4)
allows for a large sample size, and 5) the cost of collecting the data is born
primarily by archivers. There are, however, potential problems with using
written record. Access to documents may be limited, leading to sample bias.
Such problems are most limited, though, in the CEDOIN archives. Thus, I will
rely primarily on their newspaper and news magazine archives. 5.2.2.
Open-Ended Interviews with Political Elites
I will also interview political elites (in Spanish) using an open-ended
survey format. The interviews will cover the same categories used in the
content analysis of the written record. Additionally, I will ask them questions
relating to: 1) the factors they consider most important for Bolivia's
political development since 1982, 2) their assessment of the quality of
Bolivia's democracy, 3) what changes are necessary to improve Bolivia's
democracy, and 4) their assessment of the 1952 Revolution and its impact on
contemporary politics. Elite interviews are useful because of their special knowledge of and
personal involvement with the political process. While mass opinion surveys are
useful, they do not allow me to study political elites motivations and
attitudes, as well as their interpretation of events. Elite interviews also
supplement the written record; I can ask elites to elaborate on or respond to
statements they made previously, evaluate events of which they have personal
first-hand knowledge, or reflect on changes in attitudes over time. Open-ended surveys are more useful when interviewing elites. Because of
their special knowledge and involvement in the political process itself, highly
structured, close-ended surveys lack the level of informative power that
open-ended surveys provide. An open-ended survey format will allow me the
flexibility to pursue different lines of inquiry. It also gives me the flexibility
to specifically tailor surveys to the respondent, allowing me to ask only the
most relevant questions to the knowledge of that individual. Nevertheless, for
standardization purposes, I will ask some standard opening questions. These
will be designed both to set the respondent at ease as well as to establish
myself as a qualified researcher. Like all surveys, open-ended surveys are subject to potential question
order effects. To some extent, I can
control for this by letting the respondent guide the interview in certain respects.
While still making sure that each interview covers all relevant material, an
open-ended format allows me to let the respondent choose the most salient
issues first and ask him or her to elaborate on them. Further questions are, in
some regard, responses to elite statements during the interview. I will try to limit each interview to one hour in length. This limit
will help to prevent redundant or repetitive questions as well as to prevent
fatigue (both for the researcher and, more importantly, the respondent). When
permitted, I will record the interview on cassette. I will provide respondents
with full confidentiality, though I will keep track of the identity of each interviewee.
I plan to interview about 60-80 elites during my stay in Bolivia. 5.3.3.
Comparative Methods
I will also use comparative methods, including Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA), to test relationships between different political institutions
and democratic stability. Cross-national comparisons will include a variety of
institutional variables. Some of these will include differences in electoral
rules, coalition-building norms, and number and types of executive decrees.
Designed for research where the number of variables exceeds the number of cases
(Ragin 1987; 1994), QCA enables cross-national comparisons between Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru. The method makes it possible for comparative analysis to
retain the complexity of each case. Each case is considered as a constellation
of possible dichotomous (or multichotomous) variables. Nevertheless, Boolean
procedures allow for the reduction in the number of possible explanatory
variables. QCA also allows for multiple and combinatorial causal relationships. Many of the institutional variables I consider using QCA are stipulated
in constitutional frameworks and other laws. These include, among other things:
whether elections use PR systems, whether executive and legislative elections
are linked, whether executive and legislative elections are synchronic, whether
second round elections are used, the number of effective political parties,
levels of electoral disproportionality (the proportion of votes to seats), and
changes in electoral volatility (party vote share changes between elections).
The unit of observation for this
part of the study is the electoral cycle. Qualitative Comparative Analysis between Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru
does not require fieldwork in the control cases and can be finished before fieldwork
in Bolivia begins. QCA does not, however, make the fieldwork portion of the
study (content analysis of the written record and elite interviews)
unnecessary. Even if QCA establishes a possible causal relationship between
Bolivia's specific constellation of institutions and democratic stability, the
institutional hypothesis is not validated. Political institutions offer
political actors incentive structures, but political actors might act in ways
that produce the same outcome (democratic stability) for other reasons. Fieldwork
is essential to test and refute the alternate hypotheses. 6. Necessity of Field Research and Previous Research
Further research for this project requires fieldwork. Archival data is
available only in Bolivia. Elite interviews are essential to examine elite
attitudes twenty years after democratization. I conducted two preliminary
research trips: In 1998 I studied the Law of Popular Participation and spent
three months in Bolivia consulting with experts and government agencies, gathering
archival data, and familiarizing myself with Bolivia's democratization
literature. This trip persuaded me to study the role of institutions in
promoting democratic stability. I returned to Bolivia in the summer of 2001 to
reestablish and broaden my research contacts in anticipation of this longer
research trip. I presented previous research at various conferences. A paper on the
Law of Popular Participation was presented at the March 2000 congress of the
Latin American Studies Association (LASA). Papers on Bolivia's democratization
process were presented at annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science
Association (MPSA) in 1999 and 2001, as well as at the September 2001 LASA
congress. A paper comparing the quality of democracy in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela was presented at the 2000 MPSA annual meeting. These papers
were well received and I was highly encouraged at these conferences to pursue
research on Bolivia's democratic stability. 7. Affiliation Sites, On-Site Activities, and Timeframe
During my fieldwork, I will work closely with Bolivian social
scientists. I have been extended personal invitations from Carlos Toranzo,
co-director of the Latin American Institute for Social Research (ILDIS), and
Ren Antonio Mayorga, director of the Bolivian Center for Multidisciplinary
Studies (CEBEM). I will also continue expanding relationships with researchers
at the National Electoral Court (CNE) and at the USAID program for Democratic
Deepening and Citizen Participation (USAID-DDPC). Throughout my stay in
Bolivia, I will participate in academic exchanges (conferences, seminars, round
tables) and continue to familiarize myself with recent political literature. I plan to spend the first month gathering archival data, focusing
specifically on newspaper archives at CEDOIN. After organizing the archival
sources, I plan to spend the second month refining my interviewee list in
consultation with Bolivian colleagues and after reviewing archival data. By the
end of the third month, I hope to have enough interviews completed to allow for
preliminary content analysis of both archival data and elite interviews,
reviewing with Bolivian colleagues to test for intercoder reliability. After
the prelimary content analysis, I will refine my content analysis as needed. I
plan to spend the remainder of my time (at least four months) continuing to
gather elite interviews. 8.
Preliminary Outline
Chapter 1 will discuss modern democratic theory, especially as it
relates to Latin America and the third wave of democracy. It will outline the
definition of democracy and democratic stability used in this study, linking
them to the liberal theory of representative democracy and the theory of
political institutions. Chapter 2 will test the relationship between political institutions and
democratic stability in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. This analysis will rely
primarily on electoral data from all three countries from 1979-2004. I will
also test for relationships between institutional variables to test for
interactive effects. Chapters 3-7 will provide a detailed history of Bolivia's
democratization process, presenting the four possible explanations for
Bolivia's democratic stability presented in this study and liked to my research
hypotheses. Chapter 3 will give a history of the 1952 National Revolution,
focusing on its legacies and implications for the current democratic system.
Chapter 4 will give biographical histories for the three most important
politicians of the democratization period-Paz Estenssoro, Siles Zuazo, and
Bnzer. Chapter 5 will present the history of Bolivian democracy since 1978,
the year of the first transitional election. Chapter 6 will give a history of
Bolivia's political class and its relationship to the democratization process.
Chapter 7 will detail the development of Bolivia's parliamentarized
presidential system and how its institutions interacted with the
democratization process. Chapters 8-9 will present findings from the content analysis of the
written record and from the open-ended surveys, respectively. Finally, Chapter
10 will evaluate the evidence from the previous chapters and determine which of
the hypotheses seems to be the most plausible explanation for democratic
stability. I will conclude by assessing the future of Bolivia's democracy. List of Abbreviations
References
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"Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus
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Capital and the Rise of Democracy," in D. Held, et al., States and Societies (Oxford: Martin Robertson). Toranzo, C. and J. L. Exeni, eds. 1994. Relexiones sobre la Ley de Necesidad de Reforma de la Constitucin Politica del Estado (La Paz: ILDIS). Trimberger, E. K. 1978. Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New Brunswick: Transaction Press). United
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1999. Human Development Report 1999
(http://www.undp.org/hdro). Vliz, C. 1980. The Centralist Tradition in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Whitehead, L. 2001. "The Viability of Democracy," in Crabtree and Whitehead, eds., Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience (Oxford: St. Martin's Press), 3-20. Wiarda, H. 1981. Corporatism and National Development in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press). [1] While
Schumpeter does not stipulate that democracies necessarily require civil
liberties, Dahl's (1971) extension of the Shumpeterian logic explicitly makes
them necessary. [2] These
are: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right
to vote, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative
sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making
government policies accountable to voters. See Dahl (1971, 7). [3] Polyarchy
is not limited to elections; elections must be meaningful. Dahl's later works
(1990; 1998) include many of these "additions" as procedural minimums. [4] Whitehead
distinguishes viability from both consolidation and institutionalization. Like
Selbin (1999), Whitehead points out that most of the literature on democratic
consolidation emphasizes the institutionalization of democratic procedures. A
democratic system may be institutionalized, but a lacks popular support for the
democratic project, underlying socioeconomic inequalities, or other contextual
variables may lead to a breakdown of democracy. [5] The
Snchez de Lozada government oversaw a package of constitutional amendments
(popularly referred to as the "new" constitution) with the consensus of
government and opposition parties. Despite changes such as the introduction of
a multi-member proportional (MMP) electoral system and lowering the voting age
from 21 to 18, the basic framework of parliamentarized presidentialism was not
significantly altered. One important exception is Article 90: parliament now
must select the president from among the top two (rather than three) placing
candidates. [6] Demagogues
(such as Pericles) played an important role in Athenian politics. Often trained
by Sophists, they frequently spoke for some particular faction of supporters in
the assembly. [7] In
1979 parliament chose the MNR's Walter Guevara Arce; in 1980 parliament chose
Lydia Gueiler Tejada, also of the MNR. Both were overthrown by hard-line
military coups (Guevara by Alberto Natusch Busch and Gueiler by Lus Garca
Mesa). [8] This
was perhaps the most chaotic period in Bolivian politics. Celso Torrelio
overthrew Garca Mesa in August 1981. Following an abortive coup by Garca
Mesa, Guido Vildoso overthrew Torrelio in July 1982. In October 1982, Vildoso
stepped down in favor of the Congress of 1980. [9] ADN
and MNR won 33 and 30 percent of the vote respectively. The only UDP member to
do well in 1985 was MIR, which placed third after ADN and MNR with a mere 10
percent of the vote. [10] Traditional
left-wing political parties do, of course, still exist. Some, such as the
Revolutionary Leftist Front (FRI) continue to play important roles in regional
politics (FRI is still powerful in Tarija). Nevertheless, their impact is
primarily limited to local politics, except when included in the MIR candidate
lists. Some parties of the new left, such as MBL and the Movement Without Fear
(MSM) emerged in the 1990s. These parties, however, are also mostly effective
in local elections or as part of larger alliances, such as MBL's close ties to
MNR since 1993. [11] Support for neoliberal reforms was
not limited to ADN. The MNR was specifically vague about its economic program
during the 1985 electoral campaign. Some elements within the MNR, such as Paz
Estenssoro's planning minister, Snchez de Lozada, supported neoliberal reforms
and were deeply involved in crafting the NEP. [12] The
change was due, in part, to public outcry that a distant third place winner
could win the presidency, such as Paz Zamorra's election in 1989. [13] Even the hard-line military
dictatorship of Garca Mesa did not alter the statist economic model
established by the 1952 Revolution. Similarly, military dictatorships often
rested on a campesino-military alliance that retained the peasants' social gains of the
revolution, especially agrarian reform. Most of the military regimes were
essentially bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that aimed to limit the
ideological debates that emerged within the MNR-dominated regimes by 1964. [14] Bnzer himself was a member of the
MNR's military cell. The Paz Estenssoro wing of the MNR also participated in
the early period of the Bnzer regime from 1972 to 1974. [15] Self-defined as a "centrist" party,
ADN's manifesto outlines its continuation with the national revolutionary project:
the party advocates an "integrative democratic nationalism" along with an
"agrarian revolution" and a "social market economy" (Rlon Anaya 1999, 355-57). [16] Peru
and Bolivia did, however, have institutionalized parties. Peru's APRA and
Popular Action and Bolivia's MNR were firmly established parties dating back
through most of the twentieth century. The absence of any significant period of
democratic competition means that neither party was institutionalized as part
of a democratic political party system. [17] Bolivian
political parties (and individual politicians) commonly publish statements or
manifestos in the popular media; these are not limited to electoral cycles.
Unlike typical political advertising, these are essays of substantial length
meant to define the position a party, faction, or individual holds on a specific
issue. [18] This
public academic-intellectual discourse is not limited to social scientists or
other traditional intellectuals. Politicians and leaders of popular social
movements also participate in the numerous conferences and seminars; these debates
are often published for public consumption. [19] In
case a smaller time period is more appropriate, I will keep track of the data
to enable the use of weekly time series. This would provide a possible 1040
observations. |